Forced labour and the reconstruction of Burma

by Carole Reckinger (published New Statesman 9 June 2008)

http://www.newstatesman.com/asia/2008/06/forced-labour-burma-work

The Burmese military government has come under huge international pressure and criticism since cyclone Nargis destroyed large parts of Burma and killed at least 78,000 with another 56,000 people still missing. More than a month after the disaster, the UN estimates that 2.4 million people are in need of food, shelter or medical care, and more than a million have yet to receive foreign aid. Huge numbers of people are surviving in appalling conditions, with little or no help.

In the month since the disaster, only a small number of international aid workers have been granted access into the affected regions. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) has voiced its concern that Burma’s ruling military junta will use forced labour to rebuild areas of the country devastated by Cyclone Nargis. The organisation says that there is an increased risk that the reconstruction of Burma will involve further injustices such as forced labour, child labour, human trafficking and migrant labour, if it is not closely watched over.

The ILO has been at loggerheads with Burma for more than a decade over what the United Nations calls a widespread practice of forcing villagers to work on infrastructure projects or as porters for the army. The ILO is working with Burmese authorities to “ensure that the reconstruction effort does not involve the use of forced labour in any of its forms,” it said in a report on Friday. Steve Marshall, ILO’s liaison officer in Rangoon, said “so far, there have not been any verified reports of forced labor linked to the disaster, he said, adding: “We’re not saying it isn’t happening.”

Burma is well known for its use of forced labour. The Tatmadaw (Burmese military) routinely forces civilians to work on state infrastructure projects, such as for example the building of roads, bridges, military bases or even towns. The military will typically demand labour from local villages, with the threat of fines if households are unable to supply the required amount of people. The SPDC troops’ demand for labour is made easier by the existence of registration documents with details of the exact number of inhabitants, property and livestock within a village. Inhabitants have no choice but to apply for national identity cards and register their details or risk fines or arrest. The military is furthermore increasingly relying on SPDC-appointed village chairpersons as intermediaries through whom to disseminate their demands. One particularly brutal example of forced labour is SPDC’s use of villagers as human minesweepers, whereby civilians are forced to walk in front of marching columns, so that they instead of the soldiers detonate eventual mines on the way.

Projects vary in length and intensity, but they always mean that people are taken away from their land and livelihoods without any remuneration in return. The SPDC typically demands that forced labourers serve from early morning until evening and compliance with forced labour places civilians in dangerous situations, as they must travel away from their villages and communities, frequently under the supervision of low level officers and soldiers. Military personnel operate under blanket impunity, and know that they will not be held accountable for any mistreatment of civilians. Furthermore, low level officers and soldiers in charge of forced labour projects are under pressure to meet demands, quotas and timetables ordered by their superiors. Threats, harassment, beatings and even killings are not uncommon and women further risk rape and other sexual abuses. Forced labour often means that villagers are unable to work on their own agricultural work for days or even weeks on end. Regular forced labour in Mon State (South-eastern Burma), for example, has been a primary factor leading to increasing food insecurity.

Prison Labourers

Human rights organisations have reported the continuous use of forced prison labour in Burma and it is estimated that as many as 20 percent of prisoners sentenced to ‘prison with hard labour’ die as a consequence of the conditions of their detention. It has been reported that at least 91 labour camps operate in areas across the country and the thousands of prisoners in these camps are used to build highways, dams, irrigation canals, and to work on special agricultural projects. Prisoners are reportedly being forced to work 12 hours a day without rest, and the sick and weak are not exempted from work. Inmates who cannot afford bribes are condemned to the harshest labour.

The living conditions and the general treatment of forced prison labourers are widely reported to be far worse than for civilian forced labourers. The work is more dangerous, they have to work even longer hours and health provisions are non-existent. The prisoners are viewed as expendable labour and there are countless reports of their torture, beatings and killings. A constant supply of prison labour is assured by the continuing arbitrary arrests, as well as the imposition of lengthy sentences for minor misdemeanours. Those arrested often do not receive a legal process and are told that they will be released on payment of a bribe. Those who are unable to bribe the police or the judiciary are automatically sent to prison, whether there is evidence against them or not.

Forced conscription and Child soldiers

Following the suppression in 1988 of the nationwide pro democracy demonstrations, the ruling military council initiated a dramatic effort to modernize and expand the armed forces. To tighten its control over its population, the SPDC Army instituted a dramatic expansion of military personnel throughout the country. Service in the armed forces is for many a dangerous and gruelling experience and soldiers are often subjected to mistreatment by superior officers. According to the junta’s military meeting minutes, there were about 9,000 desertions during 2006, whereas the army was only able to recruit 6,000. This trend continued in 2007 and the army is facing an acute shortage of trained soldiers. General Thein Sein, Burma’s Prime Minister, has in response called for the army to recruit 7,000 soldiers per month, four times the actual monthly recruitment rate reported for mid-2005 and double the rate reported for mid-2006. Regiments are expected to actively recruit in appointed areas and are often fined when they fail to meet quotas.

Burma continues to have one of the highest numbers of child soldiers in the world. The official age of enlistment in the army is 18 years and the SPCD army has denied allegations that it forcibly conscripts and recruits children. According to the Chairman of the Committee for Prevention against Recruitment of Minors: “no forced recruitment is carried out and all the soldiers have joined the army of their own accord.” Thein Sein told the committee that minors themselves were to blame for the problem because they lied about their true age or did not inform their parents that they had enlisted in the army. In a tacit admission that there remained underage soldiers in the armed forces, Thein Sein stated that soldiers with stunted growth were not sent to forward areas but were instead given light work duties at military bases, and that illiterate youth were sent to army schools to be educated.

However, human rights groups charge the military regime with continuing to recruit large numbers of children into its army, sending boys as young as 12 to fight against ethnic minority rebels. Human Rights Watch (HRW) estimated that there may be more than 70,000 child soldiers in the SPDC Army. The children are often kidnapped on their way home from school, without their parents’ knowledge. They are then brutalised and physically abused during their induction and basic training before being shipped off to fight in the country’s ethnic states. “Child soldiers are sometimes forced to participate in human rights abuses, such as burning villages and using civilians for forced labour,” said HRW. “Those who attempt to escape or desert are beaten, forcibly re-recruited or imprisoned.”

With forced labour being such a common occurrence in the country, it is expected Burma will make use of it for the reconstruction process. Burma has a long history of ignoring the advice of International Organisations and actively hampering their freedom of movement and investment in the country, and is not about to change its stance . Once again, the military junta will throw a spanner in the works and prevent ILO from monitoring the reconstruction process properly, adding further suffering to the devastated area and a population that has been through so much already.

La hausse du prix des carburants en Indonésie

By Carole Reckinger (Luxemburger Wort)

www.wort.lu

Ce samedi, l’Indonésie a augmenté le prix des carburants malgré d’importantes manifestations. Face à la forte hausse des prix du pétrole brut, le plus grand pays d’Asie du Sud-Est a augmenté le prix de l’essence et du gazole d’environ trente pour cent. Le prix du kérosène, utilisé par la plupart des familles pauvres, a quant à lui augmenté de 25%.

Des manifestations ont eu lieu quasi journalièrement depuis l’annonce par le gouvernement de la réduction des subsides aux carburants. La hausse des prix est sensée limiter l’impact de l’envolée du cours du brut, une envolée qui est en train d’assécher les caisses de l’Etat et d’accaparer les fonds destinés aux programmes sociaux. Le budget de ce sytème de subsides s’élève à 126,8 mille milliards de roupies (8,6 milliards d’euros) et est basé sur le prix du barril de brut à 95 dollars. Celui-ci a cependant dépassé les 135 dollars mercredi dernier. Les subsides, qui ont jusqu’à présent aidé l’archipel à maintenir le prix des carburants le plus bas de la région, dépassent, selon la Banque Mondiale, l’ensemble des dépenses sociales et de l’investisesement en capital du pays. En effet, l’Indonésie finance 60% de la consommation nationale de carburants.

La hausse des prix est un sujet délicat en Indonésie, où des millions de personnes vivent avec moins de 1,3 € par jour et doivent, par dessus le marché, faire face aux prix en hausse du riz et de l’huile de cuisine. Beaucoup d’Indonésiens pensent que la hausse du prix des carburants, de pair avec celle du prix de la nourriture, grèveront durement les budgets familiaux. Pour amortir le choc, rudement ressenti par les strates les plus pauvres de la population, Jakarta a présenté un plan d’action. Le gouvernement compte distribuer près d’un milliard d’euros en aide financière à ces citoyens les plus pauvres, ceux vivant avec moins de 1,3 € par jour. Les 19,1 millions de familles ayant droit à cette aide recevront 100.000 roupies (7 euros) par mois jusqu’à la fin de l’année.

Ce projet est cependant fortement critiqué. Il est perçu par beaucoup comme ayant pour seul but de calmer les tensions politiques et sociales avant les élections présidentielles de 2009. De plus, le recensement des familles éligibles est très difficile, et le gouvernement a échoué à un exercice similaire dans le passé.

La dernière fois que l’Indonésie a augmenté le prix des carburants fut en octobre 2005, sous la présidence de Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, l’actuel Président. La hausse fut de 126% et poussa le taux d’inflation à 18%, le plus haut en six ans, malmenant les secteurs industriel, automobile et bancaire.

Quoique fasse le gouvernement, il est peu probable que les distributions d’aides financières puissent avoir un réel impact sur la pauvreté croissante des plus pauvres.

Le « tsunami silencieux »

By Carole Reckinger (Luxemburger Wort)

www.wort.lu

Ces derniers mois, le prix du riz a atteint des taux jamais atteints auparavant. En mai 2008, ils étaient deux fois ce qu’ils étaient en mai 2007. De pair avec la flambée du prix du pétrole brut, le Programme Alimentaire Mondial a décrit l’envolée du prix de la nourriture comme un « tsunami silencieux » s’abattant sur les pays pauvres.

Le coût des denrées alimentaires de base a fortement augmenté. Les cours du riz et du café ont atteint des taux record et dans certains pays, le prix du lait et de la viande ont plus que doublé. Bien que la crise alimentaire soit devenue un problème mondial, ce sont en effet les pays les plus pauvres qui en ressentent les effets le plus rudement. Les habitants des zones urbaines, surtout, souffrent de la faim, et des émeutes, à Haïti et en Indonésie entre autres, provoquent une instabilité politique croissante. Ce weekend, les envoyés de 26 pays d’Amérique Latine et des Caraïbes se sont réunis pour s’entretenir sur le sujet et dresser un programme commun pour la région, en attente du sommet mondial de Rome du 3 au 5 juin. Selon la Banque Mondiale, les prix de la nourriture dans le monde ont augmentés de 83% en trois ans. Le rapport de la FAO (Organisation des Nations Unies pour l’Alimentation et l’Agriculture)et l’OECD (Organisation de Coopération et Développement Economiques), publié mardi dernier, a quant à lui présagé que les prix des produits agricoles devraient se maintenir, la demande des pays en voie de développement et les coûts de production étant en hausse.

Face à la hausse du prix du riz, certains agriculteurs thaïlandais campent dans leurs champs, armés de carabines, pour prévenir tout maraudage et les récoltes se font sous haute sécurité. Au niveau international, plusieurs pays producteurs de riz, tel que le Cambodge, le Vietnam, l’Egypte, l’Inde, le Pakistan et la Chine limitent ou ont stoppé l’exportation pour assurer la sécurité alimentaire de leur population.

Le riz est un aliment de base en Asie et compte pour plus de 40% de la consommation de calories de la plupart des Asiatiques. Les plus pauvres dépensent une grande partie de leurs revenus sur cette denrée. L’importance culturelle du riz dans la région se manifeste, entre autres, dans la langue; ainsi, en Thaïlande, “manger” se traduit par “manger du riz” et “comment vas-tu?” par “as-tu mangé du riz aujourd’hui?”. Au Vietnam, “Bon appétit” se dit “ Mangez du riz, s’il vous plait”, même si le plat du jour est une assiette de nouilles. Il est dès lors normal que cette envolée du prix du riz et l’amenuisement des réserves mondiales soient causes d’inquiétude pour de nombreux habitants en Asie.

Le weekend dernier, l’Indonésie a augmenté le prix des carburants de presque 30%, accentuant ainsi la pression sur les plus pauvres. Ce pays nous livre un exemple concret: le nombre de pauvres s’accru de plusieurs millions après la crise économique de 1997, quand le prix du riz augmenta fortement. Il y a peu de doutes que la tourmente économique et politique qui frappa alors l’Indonésie fut aggravée par la flambée spectaculaire du prix du riz.

Dans les prochains mois, les récoltes de riz, aussi bien dans l’hémisphère sud que l’hémisphère nord, pourraient aider à stabiliser le marché. Cependant, le cours du riz restera probablement très haut jusqu’en octobre ou novembre au moins, quand la grande partie des récoltes de 2008 apparaîtra sur les marchés. Les experts semblent être d’accord sur un point au moins : l’ère de la nourriture bon marché est révolue.

Le bilan de six ans d’indépendance au Timor Oriental.

by Carole Reckinger (Luxemburger Wort)

www.wort.lu

Hier, le Timor Oriental a fêté sa sixième année d’indépendance. Les six dernières années ont été témoin de nombreuses difficultés, et l’année qui vient ne s’annonce guère plus facile. Le paysage timorais porte encore de nombreuses cicatrices laissées par les raids de milices de 1999, après le vote pour la prise d’indépendance et la fin de l’occupation indonésienne. Ces raids causèrent de nombreux dégâts, avec plus de 70% de l’infrastructure détruite et près des trois quart de la population déplacées. Une mission des Nations Unies, mandatée par le Conseil de Sécurité, ayant pour but de faciliter une transition vers un Etat stable et un dévelopement durable (1999-2002), ainsi que d’autres missions se sont succédes depuis lors.

D’après la plupart des commentateurs, le pays se portait plutôt bien jusqu’à la crise de 2006, quand trente-huit personnes furent tuées, la police temporairement suspendue et la moitié des forces armées licenciée. La violence continua jusqu’à la compagne électorale de 2007 et l’attaque quasi-fatale sur le Président Ramos-Horta en février 2008. La crise révéla une tendance aux politiques d’identités suivant des caractéristiques régionales, un faible secteur sécuritaire, et une strate de la population aisément mobilisable lors de conflits: la jeunesse urbaine. Les réformes au niveau de la police et de l’armée, essentielles au développement économique et social du pays, se font toujours attendre.

L’attaque sur le Président José Ramos-Horta en février 2008 souligna le besoin urgent de s’attaquer aux origines du conflit au Timor Oriental. La crise non résolue des personnes déplacés à l’intérieur du territoire est un des problèmes, aussi bien une conséquence des violences passées qu’une possible cause de troubles futurs. Près de deux ans après les incidents d’avril 2006, près de 100.000 personnes sont toujours déplacées. Le Program Alimentaire Mondial (PAM) a, le mois passé, interrompu ses distributions de riz aux camps de réfugiés, menaçant de famine des dizaines de milliers de personnes. De nombreux réfugiés ont toujours peur de rentrer chez eux après les raids de 2006, lors desquelles de nombreuses maisons furent détruites. Pour la plupart, cependant, c’est la menace de la faim qui reste la raison principale de leur réticence à quitter les camps. Le Timor Oriental reste un des pays les plus pauvres du monde, avec un très haut taux de chômage et au moins 40% de la population vivant sous le seuil de pauvreté officiel de 0.55 US$ par jour.

Le futur ne s’annonce donc pas facile pour le Timor Oriental. Le gouvernement du Premier Ministre Xanana Gusmao est bord de l’effondrement, face au départ de plusieurs partis membres de l’AMP (Alliance Majoritaire Parlementaire, l’alliance au pouvoir). Ceci laisse la porte ouverte au Fretilin (Front révolutionnaire pour l’indépendance du Timor-Oriental, dont Gusmao fut le leader jusque dans les années 80), qui a gagné la majorité aux élections générales l’année passée mais fut empeché par la coalition AMP de former un gouvernement. Le week-end passé, l’ASDT (Association Sociale Démocrate Timoraise) a quitté la coalition et a signé une alliance avec le Fretilin. Le leader du PSD (Party Social Démocrate), Mario Carrascalao, a critiqué Mr Gusmao et ses ministres mais a déclaré que, pour le moment, sont parti comptait rester dans la coalition, malgré le mécontentement parmi ses propres rangs.

Face à ces nombreuses difficultés, le Président Ramos-Horta a récemment demandé à l’ONU de rester au Timor Oriental au moins jusqu’en 2012. Il a ajouté que le pays nécessiterait aussi une continuation jusqu’à l’année prochaine de la présence de la force multinationale menée par l’Australie. Celle-ci compte néanmoins retirer 200 soldats car elle estime que la sécurité s’est suffisemment améliorée depuis l’attaque sur le Président.

Face à l’optimisme australien, il reste à voir comment la situation va se développer.

Where next for Tibet?

by Carole Reckinger (Redpepper)

http://www.redpepper.org.uk/article1200.html

China promised human rights improvements to win the Olympics but Carole Reckinger says nothing will change once the eyes of the world are no longer watching

As the Olympic torch moves along its 137,000 kilometer journey, it leaves a smoky trail of pro-Tibetan and other human rights related protests. The celebrities and athletes carrying the torch hidden behind a phalanx of Chinese flame attendants and police officers on bikes. There’s still four months to go but the Olympic consumer brand looks tarnished.

Recently, the Chinese president, Hu Jintao insisted that Beijing’s handling of the upheaval was its own affair while the Chinese Ambassador to the UK accused the Western media of demonizing China. At the same time the International Olympic Committee (IOC) reiterated that it will not intervene to pressure China on Tibet or any other political issue.

There is a risk that the perceptions of the West and people in China are drifting in opposite directions. I have witnessed a number of passionate debates between my pro-Tibetan and Chinese friends. The same issues always reoccur: ‘have you been to Tibet?’ ‘why didn’t you raise this before the Olympics?’ and Tibet has been part of China for the last x hundred years. But the outrage should not be targeted against the Chinese people but against the destruction of a way of life by the Chinese state.

The Chinese authorities promised the IOC and the international community concrete improvements in human rights to win the 2008 Olympics for Beijing but nothing much has happened and the recent jailing of human rights activist Hu Jia reflects the hardening stance towards dissent. Sophie Richardson, Asia Advocacy Director of Human Rights Watch, declared that ‘Hu Jia’s sentence shows that you can’t defend human rights in China without becoming a case yourself … His arrest was unjustified, his trial unfair and his sentence unwarranted.’ Furthermore, Chinese security forces are still struggling to stamp out flaring violence in areas of Tibetan China.

‘Cultural Genocide?’
The Tibetan revolt of 2008, like those in 1987 and 1959 will be crushed by the overwhelming might of the Chinese military. The current protests are unlikely to result in anything more than the temporary re-imposition of military rule and further repression. As Hu Jintao reiterated the aspirations of greater autonomy, independence or even political unity of the Tibetan areas is extremely threatening to the Chinese state. The Chinese regard Tibet as historically part of China and consider the Dalai Lama, and his followers, as doctrinaire reactionaries opposing the social and economic progress that China brings to what they consider a backward province.

So why do the Tibetans oppose Chinese tutelage and the economic and social progress they have brought? Firstly, many Tibetans feel excluded from the development and money that China pours into their homeland. Chinese migrants are resented by Tibetans, who argue that they take the best jobs. The Dalai Lama has accused China of ‘cultural genocide,’ that this influx has been devastating and with China gaining political, economic and military control in Tibet. The Tibetans have slowly become marginalised and a minority in their own land. China’s consistently uses excessive military force to stifle dissent has resulted in widespread human rights abuses, including political imprisonment, torture and execution. At least 60 deaths have been documented by human rights groups since 1987 and the names of over 700 Tibetan political prisoners have been confirmed. Many are detained without charge or trial under ‘reeducation through labour’ administrative regulations.

China’s crackdown on the monk-led rallies in Lhasa is part of a long history of the Chinese state’s control of the monasteries and Buddhist orders. This started almost as soon as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) marched into Tibet in 1950. Following the invasion, Tibet’s culture was suppressed and more than 6000 monasteries, temples and historic buildings were destroyed.

China’s grip on the Buddhist order became very visible in 1995, when the Dalai Lama named the new reincarnation of the Panchen Lama (second only to the Dalai Lama in terms of spiritual seniority). The selected six-year-old Gedhun Choekyi Nyima and his immediate family disappeared within days and his whereabouts remain unknown. The Tibetan government in exile claims he continues to be the youngest political prisoner in the world while the Chinese government asserts he is leading a normal life somewhere in China, his whereabouts secret to protect him. Soon after his disappearance, the Chinese government announced that it had found the real Panchen Lama, a six-year-old who happened to be the son of two Tibetan Communist Party workers. Most monks regard him as a false lama, though he is venerated by ordinary Tibetans.

Beijing 2008
The Chinese and other Olympic supporters argue that the games are about sports and not politics. The promotion of the Olympic spirit, however, includes upholding ethics in sports and encouraging respect for human rights. The games are a sporting event, but nonetheless involve international norms and shared values. The Chinese accuse the Dalai Lama of trying to boycott the games and ignore his repeated statements that he wants the Olympic Games to go ahead. He states that while the Chinese deserve the Games, activists are entitled to nonviolent protests.

Protests and boycotts are part of the Olympics. To mention two examples, in 1908 Irish athletes, angered at the refusal of Britain to give Ireland its independence boycotted the London Games and the 1956 Melbourne Games were boycotted by Egypt, Iraq and Lebanon because of the Suez invasion by Britain and France. The biggest boycott took place in 1980 when 62 countries led by the United States stayed away from Moscow following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan the previous year.

It is still unclear what affect the crisis in Tibet will have in the long-term. The options for Tibetans are changing, many are increasingly frustrated as they see little sign of progress after decades of waiting. Young Tibetans are becoming increasingly impatient with the Dalai Lama’s peaceful means. Although they remain loyal, they believe that confrontation might be more effective for securing their rights. While the spotlight is still on China, it cannot afford to crack down too hard on the Tibetan people. During the last upheaval in 1987, very few in the West knew where Tibet was, let alone its tragic history. The Chinese government responded with executions, arbitrary arrests and torture. China was still a relatively isolated country and did not need international opinion on their side. Nineteen years on, much has changed, The Dalai Lama has raised Tibet’s profile and China has ‘opened up.’ Admitted to the WTO, secured billions in corporate capital and is hosting the 2008 Olympics, nonetheless, as the Burmese can testify, public and media attention can shift very quickly. Many of those protesting in Tibet know they might die in one of the many secret prison cells. When the world is no longer watching, they might be killed along with those that risked all to get the focus of the world.

Where next for Burma?

By Carole Reckinger (NewStatesman UK 8April 2008)

http://www.newstatesman.com/200804080007

Six months ago the world watched a courageous attempt led by Buddhist monks to replace military dictatorship with democracy. But what’s the situation in Burma today?

In recent days much of the world’s attention has been firmly fixed on Tibet and the plight of the Burmese people seems to have been all but forgotten.

And yet things are not improving in that country. Far from it. According to one renowned Buddhist leader, the situation is deteriorating six months on from the bloody military crackdown against the pro-democracy movement.

Many monks have been forced to cross into Thailand and Malaysia because of political persecution. There are widespread allegations of disappearances, murder and torture by the dictatorship.

All this seems to be continuing despite an announcement by the military junta that next month a national referendum will be held on a new constitution with elections following in 2010.

The state media reported that “the time has now come to change from military rule to democratic civilian rule”. Considering the junta’s numerous broken promises, the announcement to restore democratic civilian rule has been at best received with scepticism.

The constitution drafting process has been carefully engineered since 1993 and unsurprisingly contains no input from the public instead being drawn up by a handpicked assembly, without the participation of the country’s main democratic opposition and its leader Aung San Suu Kyi.

In fact draft constitution will bar her from holding government office because she was married to a foreigner. It is already clear that the constitution will ensure the military retains a stronghold on power in Burma and 25 per cent of the seats in the new parliament will be reserved for the armed forces.

Civilians will be permitted to enter parliament, but only if they show due deference to the military leaders. It furthermore allows stringent restrictions on any activities deemed “inimical to national unity” which covers a wide range of criticism and dissent.

Indeed, criticism of the draft constitution is punishable with up to 20 years behind bars, and criticising the referendum with up to three.

The question of how a free vote will take place in such a climate remains something of a riddle, and - unsurprisingly - the draft constitution has been denounced by critics as a ruse to consolidate the junta’s power. The rejection of an UN offer to send international monitors has only heightened these suspicions.

Than Shwe, Burma’s 75 year old leader, declared before an audience of diplomats that the military regime that has ruled Burma for 45 years had now “a sincere aim for developing the country without any cravings for power”.

He however, made no reference to the bloody oppression his regime is still perpetrating and one wonders who he can fool with this statement.

The world still remembers when thousands of Burmese took to the streets making a variety of demands reflecting the widespread dissatisfaction with the continued military rule and the policies of the ruling State Peace and Development Council.

At least 227 distinct protests in 66 towns were staged which resulted in the deaths of officially 15 people (independent estimates state at least twice this number). Approximately 6,000 people were arrested, including as many as 1,400 monks. It is estimated that at least 700 protesters and monks remain in detention.

The ruling ‘State Peace and Development Council’ has denied any knowledge of the majority of those it killed during the protests. No attempts have been made to identify the dead, return the bodies to the families or even give the dead the minimum Buddhist funerary rites.

Instead, numerous testimonies have revealed a strategy in which bodies were removed systematically to cover up the extent of the violence. The Human Rights Documentation Unit of the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma refers in Bullets in the Alms Bowl to persistent reports testifying to the fact that Ye Way Crematorium in North Okkalapa Township was operated from the 27th to the 30th of September by security forces to dispose most probably of the bodies of those killed.

By cracking down on monks, the junta took a calculated risk when violence against the country’s spiritual leaders was bound to inflame popular sentiments. Burmese monks are highly revered in Burmese society.

Considered to be ‘Sons of Buddha’ they represent the strongest institution in Burma after the military. Although according to the Buddhist monastic code, monks are not supposed to involve themselves in mundane politics, they have played an important social and political role in history.

Throughout British rule for instance, the so called ‘political monks’ played an important role in mobilising opposition to colonial excesses. After independence, monastic organisations pushed the new leaders to make Buddhism the state religion.

Attempts in the 1960s and 70s to bring Buddhism under tighter control was met with fierce resistance and Burma’s young and active Buddhist community of about 300,000 has had an uneasy relationship with the ruling generals.

During the 1988 democracy marches, the independent monks union emerged to support the students. The regime responded by issuing decrees to keep the monks in line and banning all independent Buddhist organizations.

Over the last two decades, the monks have observed a religious boycott of the regime and have refused alms from the military regime or simply overturned their bowls instead of collecting food and donations. By ruthlessly keeping monastic involvement in politics to a minimum since 1988, the role of the monks at the head of the recent protests took many, including the Government, by surprise.

Burma specialist Michael Charney points out that although it may appear that the State has successfully cowed the monks into submission, they have in the past survived more serious episodes of persecution.

“Given their importance in Burmese society and their resilience in past periods of political turmoil, it would be foolish to assume that they will not rebound from current setbacks,” he argues.

The authorities have resolutely tried to snuff out dissent and intelligence officers have systematically detained thousands of people believed to have participated in the protests.

Anger is still floating beneath the surface, and this is even the case for many people who were previously apolitical.

The crackdown has altered dynamics inside Burma and the country’s future is still unknown. The level of fear, but also anger is unprecedented.

More importantly, following international outrage over the brutal behaviour of the military regime, there were indications that differences have grown within the military itself.

Every government in Burma, going back to monarchical times has sought legitimacy through the Buddhist Sangha. Many within the military feel guilt-ridden and ashamed of their role in beating and killing monks.

There are no open splits yet, but there have been rumblings of mismanagement and corruption. The younger generation of generals is slowly beginning to realise change is inevitable.

When that change will actually come is harder to gauge.

East Timor forfeits its newest hero

by Carole Reckinger & Sara Gonzalez Devant (published RedPepper)

Following the attack on East Timor president Jose Ramos Hortes, Carole Reckinger and Sara Gonzalez Devant report on the complexities surrounding the current crisis

Two weeks ago, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) news and analysis service reported that Timor-Leste’s quiescent security environment ‘breached only occasionally, as with two recent small explosions in Dili … and the rare provocation by Alfredo Reinado … is conducive for Timor-Leste to carry out its much needed reforms.’ The report was published only hours before Timor-Leste’s president Jose Ramos-Horta was shot and prime minister Xanana Gusmao ambushed on the morning of 11 February 2008. The president is recovering in a hospital in Australia, having regained consciousness after a ten day induced coma.

On the day of the attack a state of emergency was instated and arrest warrants issued against 17 people. Among them, Gastao Salsinha, reportedly in command of the defectors after their leader Alfredo Reinado, a former military police major, was killed during the attack on Ramos-Horta.

Incredulity and anger prevails in Dili. International forces dispatched to Timor-Leste to keep the peace have met with harsh criticism for their failure to prevent the attack. The incident has also triggered anger and distrust among the population. However, the significance of the attack does not lie in the security forces failings.

The assault on the supreme constitutional symbols – prime minister and president- the very heroes of the liberation struggle, lays bare Timor’s national identity crisis. Not only because the country was so close to losing its icons but because it lost its newest icon in Alfredo Reinado. He was given a hero’s burial in Dili, his coffin draped in the Timorese flag and, as BBC article reports, ‘his bearded face looked down defiantly from banners in a revolutionary pose that deliberately aped the portraits they used to host of Xanana Gusmao.’

Military and police under a single command
In an attempt to catch Reinado’s men East Timor‘s authorities have merged police and army under a single command.

The underlying rationale that it is necessary to guarantee the adequate mobilisation of security and defence forces during the state of exception. But the decision has sparked criticism. The lack of a clear separation between internal and external security may be fatal for the nascent security institutions and lead to tension as it did in 2006. Then, after the sacking of mutinous soldiers, rioting resulted in at least 37 deaths and the displacement of over 150,000 people.

The 2006 crisis and the breakdown of security forces
In April 2006 Dili went up in flames after 600 soldiers protested against discrimination within the ranks of the newly formed Timorese army. The protesters, ‘or petitioners’, were summarily dismissed. Clashes between elements of the national police force (PNTL) and the military (F-FDTL) led to a power vacuum and the breakdown of law and order across the country.

Neither the PNTL nor the F-FDTL had the trust of the population or the capacity to provide adequate security and order. Repeated allegations of sexual harassment, human rights violations, illegal weapons distribution and engagement in illicit trade weakened the public’s confidence in the PNTL in particular. As the 2006 crisis demonstrated neither police nor military were politically neutral, both institutions fragmented due to mixed regional and political loyalties in the ranks, although ethnic and regional divisions had not previously been prominent in Timor-Leste.

With the collapse of the security sector and law and order in general, a multinational peacekeeping force was requested to restore order in late May 2006. Since then efforts have been made to resolve the multiple issues affecting both institutions, but reversing the breakdown is not a simple task.

Reinado, the symbol of a disillusioned Timor-Leste
Reinado, one of the leaders of the mutineers, emerged from the 2006 crisis as a key player. His popularity is remarkable, even after apparently leading an attack on the two most prominent (living) heroes of the liberation struggle. A BBC report cautioned that ‘there is something worrying about the readiness of East Timor‘s young to pass the hero’s mantle on to a man like Reinado, who took up arms against the government in the chaos of May 2006 and refused to lay them down. Reinado had nothing to offer East Timor except the continued idealisation of armed struggle as an alternative to the unglamorous task of building a country from very little.’

But analysis such as the BBC’s cites overemphasises the institutional failings of the Timorese state and pays little attention to the role of popular perception in articulating the country’s predicament. The crisis exists as much on the streets of Dili as it does at the state level. It is not quite as simple as glamour versus nation building. Nation building is a highly political moment, particularly after a major political crisis, and politics are key to Reinado’s popularity. But to understand his popular appeal focus must shift away from the institutional context and to a major societal crisis that has been ongoing since 2006- internal displacement.

Internal displacement
The vast majority of the persons displaced during the 2006 crisis have not returned to their homes. About 100,000 refugees remain in camps. Of these, 30,000 are in the capital Dili. To reduce camp populations and fearing some camps would become permanent, authorities decided to cut food rations in February 2008 with food aid ending completely by March 2008. But with the state of emergency this decision could not have come at a worse time.

Atul Khare, UN Special Representative for the Secretary General in Timor-Leste, has explained that resettlement is extremely complex, because it involves addressing land and property issues and community hostility. The UN humanitarian coordinator also said that ‘for many IDPs [internally Displaced People] it is simply not an option for them to return to their neighbourhoods as the people there don’t want them back… Six thousand of their houses have been burned and only 450 transitional shelters have been built to date. There is nowhere to go back to.’

The rise and fall of Alfredo Reinado
Reinado became a symbol of the disenfranchised – youths, the poor, veterans –and key to balancing peace in East Timor. Shortly after his arrest in 2006, he escaped from Becora prison along with 56 other inmates, later boasting that he waved at New Zealand soldiers as he left. In March 2007 the president at this time, Xanana Gusmao, sanctioned an Australian operation to capture Reinado after his men raided weapons from a police post. The operation resulted in several deaths but Reinado eluded capture, his popularity growing among Dili youths. He was able to represent the projected hopes of many of those for whom independence brought more disappointment and poverty.

Reinado was a liability but also bold and charismatic. His defiant messages to the authorities and vanishing acts made him a romantic figure that resonated with a generation that had lost its heroes. Journalist Max Stahl has likened him to Che Guevara, ‘a poster figure on laptops, and graffiti sketches around Dili.’

While most media reports have been quick to qualify the attacks as a coup or assassination attempt, others are more cautious. The emerging theory is Reinado was losing his support base among the petitioners. It is likely the attack, increasingly rumoured to have been an attempted kidnapping rather than an assassination attempt or coup, was a pre-emptive move to prevent the impending defection of his support base.

There is a thin line between rumour, misinformation and premature conclusions as reported in the media. Observers have increasingly focused on the fact very little is known about what actually happened on the morning of the 11 February. As one blogger has observed, even of what little is known there are conflicting reports:

’I have heard/read “Alfredo shot in a bedroom/shot at the front gate”, “shooting started at 6:50am versus Alfredo shot 30 minutes before the President”, “kidnap not assassination”, “PM Xanana knew nothing about what happened 40 minutes before / made fully aware”, my cyclist friend [who warned the President of gun-shots when he was returning home from his morning exercise, moments before he was shot] has been elevated to diplomat but downgraded to jogger.’

Reinado’s popularity even after his death attests to a social reality that is quite different from what appears in the international media-the hero of the disenfranchised, rather than the outlandish renegade. Timor-Leste may have lost its most recent hero in Reinado but the nature of his achievements is perhaps more emblematic of Timor-Leste’s youths’ frustrations and loss of purpose.

Osttimor: Aufstieg und Fall des Alfredo Reinado

Published Brennpunkt 241

Carole Reckinger & Sara Gonzalez Devant

Am 11. Februar 2008 kommt es in der Hauptstadt Osttimors zu einem mysteriösen Zwischenfall. Bei einer Attacke auf Präsident Ramos-Horta kommt es zu mehreren Todesopfern, darunter auch der mutmaßliche Anführer der Täter, Alfredo Reinado

Der Nachrichtenservice der UN-OCHA (UN-Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) meldete im Februar 2008, dass die entspannte Sicherheitslage in Ost-Timor – nur gelegentlich durch kleine Bombenexplosionen und einige provozierende Aktionen von Major Alfredo Reinado gestört - das Ausführen der dringend notwendigen Reformen erlaubt. Wenige Stunden später, am 11 Februar 2008, wurde Präsident Jose Ramos-Horta niedergeschossen und der Premierminister Xanana Gusmao Opfer eines Hinterhalts. Seither liegt Ramos-Horta im australischen Darwin im Krankenhaus, wo er erst 10 Tage nach der Tat aus dem Koma erwachte.

Gleich nach dem Anschlag auf die höchsten Amtsträger des Staates wurde der Ausnahmezustand ausgerufen und Haftbefehle gegen insgesamt 17 Verdächtige ausgestellt. Über 1000 Polizisten durchkämmten die Hügel rund um die Hauptstadt Dili auf der Suche nach den Abtrünnigen. Gesucht wurde vor allem nach Gastao Salsinha, dem neuen Anführer der Rebellen, nachdem der bisherige Leader, Major Alfredo Reinado, bei der Attacke auf den Präsidenten getötet worden war.

Nach den tragischen Ereignissen richtete sich die allgemeine Wut vor allem gegen die internationale Schutztruppe, die zur Aufrechterhaltung des Friedens im Land stationiert ist. Der timoresische Brigadegeneral Taur Matan Ruak zeigte sich empört, dass die internationalen Truppen offensichtlich unfähig sind, eine Gruppe bewaffneter Männer daran zu hindern die Hauptstadt zu betreten und einen Anschlag auf die höchsten Würdenträger des Staates auszuführen. Der Bruder des Präsidenten bezeichnete die UN-Polizisten gar als Feiglinge, die sich eher verstecken würden als den Präsidenten zu schützen.

Doch die Bedeutung dieser Attacke liegt weniger in dem Versagen der Sicherheitskräfte; vielmehr wurde dadurch die tiefe Identitätskrise sichtbar, die das Land beherrscht. Nicht nur die Tatsache, dass das Land fast seine beiden nationalen Ikonen - der Premierminister und ehemalige Freiheitskämpfer Gusmao, sowie der Präsident und Nobelpreisträger Ramos-Horta – verloren hatte, bewegt die Gemüter. Der Tod des aufstrebenden Idols der Osttimoresen und mutmaßlichen Anführers der Täter, Alfredo Reinado, wiegt fast ebenso schwer. Dem Major wurde ein regelrechtes Staatsbegräbnis zuteil, sein Sarg eingewickelt in die Flagge Ostimors. Einem BBC-Artikel zufolge wurden während der Zeremonie Transparente geschwenkt, auf denen Reinado in der gleichen heroischen Pose dargestellt war, in der üblicherweise Freiheitsheld Gusmao abgebildet wird.

Um die augenblickliche Lage in Ost-Timor verstehen zu können, ist eine ausgewogene Betrachtung vonnöten, zwischen den abstrakten institutionellen Herausforderungen des Landes einerseits und der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung eben dieser Herausforderungen auf er anderen Seite. Was bisher fehlte, ist eine Perspektive die sowohl die institutionellen, als auch die gesellschaftlichen Aspekte beleuchtet.

Die Krise von 2006

Im Zuge der Suche nach den Anhängern von Major Alfredo Reinado haben die Autoritäten das Militär und die Polizei unter einheitliches Kommando gestellt. Die Zusammenlegung der PNTL (Polizei) und der F-FDTL (Militär) für die Dauer des Ausnahmezustands war vom Ministerrat in einer Resolution beschlossen worden. Der bereits oben zitierte Brigadegeneral Taur Matan Ruak versprach in einer Pressekonferenz „das in die Sicherheitskräfte gelegte Vertrauen nicht zu enttäuschen und Ruhe und Stabilität wieder herzustellen.“

Die Entscheidung hat aber sogleich Kritiker auf den Plan gerufen, die bei einer Zusammenlegung von Polizei und Militär auch eine diffuse Aufgabenteilung zwischen beiden Kräften befürchten. Ohne klare Trennung zwischen interner und externer Sicherheit kann es zu Spannungen kommen, ähnlich wie jene im Jahr 2006. Damals hatte eine Pattsituation zwischen beiden Institutionen eine landesweite Krise ausgelöst, die zu 37 Toten sowie 150 000 Flüchtlingen führte und von der sich Ost-Timor immer noch nicht erholt hat.

Im April 2006 ging die Hauptstadt Dili in Flammen auf, nachdem ungefähr 600 Soldaten, etwa ein Drittel der Streitkräfte, gegen Diskriminierung innerhalb der Armee protestiert hatten und daraufhin kurzerhand entlassen wurden. Heftige Zusammenstösse zwischen der Polizei und der Armee führte zu einem Machtvakuum und dem Zusammenbruch von Recht und Ordnung im Land.

Beide Institutionen besitzen heute nicht mehr das Vertrauen der Bevölkerung. Mehrere Fälle von sexueller Belästigung, Menschenrechtsverletzungen und Waffenschmuggel haben die Glaubwürdigkeit der bewaffneten Kräfte schwer beschädigt, insbesondere die der PNTL (Polizei). Der frühere Innenminister Rogério Lobato wurde angeklagt und verurteilt, als man ihm nachweisen konnte, dass er in den ersten Tagen des Konfliktes Waffen an Zivilisten aushändigen ließ.

Die Krise von 2006 hat gezeigt, dass sich weder das Militär, noch die Polizei politisch neutral verhält. Waren ethnische oder regionale Disparitäten ehemals nur wenig präsent in Ost-Timor konnte man innerhalb beider Institutionen eine klare Fragmentierung nach politischen und regionalen Loyalitäten erkennen, die während des Konfliktes auf die Bevölkerung überging. Seit Mai 2006 versucht eine multinationale Friedenstruppe für Ruhe und Ordnung zu sorgen, doch eine Neuaufstellung der nationalen Sicherheitskräfte kommt trotz Bemühungen nur schleppend voran.

Major Alfredo, Symbol eines desillusionierten Osttimor

Major Alfredo Reinado ging als starker Mann aus der Krise von 2006 hervor. Seine Popularität innerhalb der Bevölkerung ist auch heute noch ungebrochen, obwohl er im Februar 2008 den Anschlag auf die zwei prominentesten Protagonisten des Befreiungskampfes ausgeführt hatte und dabei umkam. Ein BBC-Bericht warnte: „Es ist Besorgnis erregend, dass die junge Generation bereit ist einen Mann wie Reinado als Helden zu verehren, der 2006 die Waffen gegen die Regierung erhob und nicht bereit war sie niederzulegen. Major Reinado hatte nichts weiter anzubieten als die kontinuierliche Idealisierung des bewaffneten Kampfes, als Alternative zu der unglamourösen Aufgabe, einen funktionierenden Staat aufzubauen.“

Solche Analysen überschätzen allerdings die institutionelle Schwäche des timoresischen Staates und ignorieren, dass die Krise schon längst die Strassen von Dili erreicht hat. Der Aufbau eines Staates ist eine politische Frage, umso mehr nach einem Konflikt wie dem von 2006. Die heutige Popularität von Major Reinado geht vor allem von einer sozialen Krise aus, die seit 2006 ungelöst ist: die internen Vertreibungen.

Interne Vertreibung

Die überwiegende Mehrheit der während der Auseinandersetzungen von 2006 geflüchteten Menschen ist immer noch nicht in ihre Behausungen zurückgekehrt. Etwa 100.000 Vertriebene leben noch in Flüchtlingscamps, vor allem in der Hauptstadt Dili. Aus Furcht, diese Lager könnten zu dauerhaften Siedlungen und schlussendlich zu einem Sicherheitsrisiko werden, beschlossen die Autoritäten im Februar 2008 die Nahrungsmittelrationen herabzusetzen und sie im März gänzlich auszusetzen. Eine Entscheidung die zum denkbar schlechtesten Moment kam, da zu diesem Zeitpunkt bereits der Ausnahmezustand ausgerufen war.

Nichtsdestotrotz sind sich die Autoritäten sehr wohl bewusst, dass das Problem überaus komplex ist. „Die Lage der Vertriebenen ist eine politische und humanitäre Frage, sowie eine Gefahr für die Sicherheit, die nicht kurzfristig zu lösen ist“, erklärte der Unterstaatssekretär für die Friedensmission in einer offenen Debatte des Sicherheitsrats. Atul Khare, der UN-Gesandte in Osttimor meinte, dass die Wiederansiedlung der Vertrieben deshalb so komplex ist, weil Fragen des Landrechts ungeklärt sind und Heimkehrende oft mit Feindseligkeit von Seiten der Ansässigen konfrontiert werden.

Sein Stellvertreter verdeutlichte die Situation in einem Interview: „Für viele Vertriebene ist unmöglich zurückzukehren, da die Menschen in ihren Heimatgebieten sie ganz einfach nicht haben wollen. Etwa 6000 Häuser sind niedergebrannt und nur 450 provisorische Hütten wieder aufgebaut worden. Sie wissen ganz einfach nicht wohin sie zurückkehren sollen. Und sogar wenn ihr Haus tatsächlich noch steht, wohnt möglicherweise bereits jemand anderes darin und es ist unmöglich festzustellen wer der rechtmäßige Besitzer ist.“

Aufstieg eines Idols

Desto weniger die Regierung in der Lage schien, die Folgen der Krise von 2006 zu bewältigen, desto populärer wurde Alfredo Reinado. Damals führte er eine Gruppe von Militärs und Sicherheitskräften aus der Hauptstadt Dili hinaus und obwohl er Premierminister Gusmao seine Gefolgschaft versicherte, blieb seine Rolle ungewiss. Er wurde schnell zum Idol der Jugend, der Veteranen und Armen in der Bevölkerung und zu einer Schlüsselfigur bei der Wiederherstellung des Friedens im Land.

Kurz nach seiner Inhaftierung im Zuge der Krise 2006, floh er aus dem Gefängnis Becora, zusammen mit 56 seiner Gefolgsleute. Später brüstete er sich in einem Interview damit, bei seinem Ausbruch den neuseeländischen Soldaten der internationalen Schutztruppe zugewinkt zu haben. In der Folge versteckte sich Reinado im Untergrund und alle Aufrufe Gusmaos, er solle sich der Justiz stellen, blieben vergebens. Im März 2007, nachdem die Männer Reinados ein Postamt überfallen hatten, bewilligte der Premierminister eine Operation der australischen Truppen die darauf abzielte, ihn gefangen zu nehmen. Bei der Aktion kam es zu mehreren Toten, doch Alfredo Reinaldo entkam – und wurde immer populärer.

Viele Menschen, denen die Unabhängigkeit bislang nur Enttäuschungen und Armut gebracht hatte, projizierten ihre Hoffnungen auf Major Alfredo Reinaldo. Charismatisch und mit einem Hang zur Theatralik, forderte er die Regierung immer wieder auf dreiste Art und Weise heraus. Von der jungen Generation, die ihre Helden verloren hatte, wurde er quasi zu einer romantischen Figur hochstilisiert. Max Stahl nannte ihn den „Che Guevara Osttimors“ : Ein Posterboy, dessen Konterfei in Graffitis auf die Mauern von Dili gesprüht wurde.

Gerüchte und Spekulationen

Und dann kam der mysteriöse Anschlag im Februar 2008. Die meisten Medien zögerten nicht die Attacke als Putsch- oder Mordversuch zu brandmarken, andere waren etwas vorsichtiger. James Dunn beispielsweise schrieb: „Wir wissen nicht genug über die Tat, da steckt sicherlich viel mehr dahinter als es auf den ersten Blick scheint. Es ist unwahrscheinlich dass es ein Putschversuch war, jedenfalls wäre er völlig stümperhaft geplant gewesen, was man sich bei einem ehemaligen Major der Armee nicht vorstellen kann.“

Es wird heute darüber spekuliert, Alfredo hätte durch die erfolgreichen Vermittlungsversuche von Präsident Ramos-Horta den Rückhalt innerhalb seiner Gefolgschaft verloren. Möglicherweise war der Anschlag - der mittlerweile mehr als Entführung denn als Mord- oder Putschversuch angesehen wird - ein Versuch den drohenden Verfall seiner Bewegung vorzubeugen. Die aktuellen Ereignisse in Osttimor haben jedoch zu einem regelrechten Durcheinander an Spekulationen und Vermutungen über die Hintergründe der Attacke geführt. Da nur wenige Informationen bekannt sind, konzentrieren sich die Mutmaßungen auf die möglichen Nutznießer eines Putsches und leiten daraus die Ereignisse des 11ten Februars ab. So verschwimmen in der Berichterstattung die Grenzen zwischen Gerüchten, Desinformation und voreiligen Schlüssen.

Major Alfredos Popularität, die auch nach seinem Tod andauert, bestätigt jedenfalls den sozialen Hintergrund der Krise: Er wird eher als der Held der Entrechteten angesehen, denn als gewaltbereiter Abtrünniger. Die Analysen sollten diesen Widerspruch berücksichtigen und der Frage nachgehen, warum dies der Fall war. Denn der Aufstieg und Fall des Alfredo Renaldo steht vielleicht sinnbildlich für die Frustration und die Perspektivlosigkeit der Jugend von Osttimor.

Rumour, Intrigue and the Demise of a Key Player in Timor-Leste’s’s latest crisis

Carole Reckinger & Sara Gonzalez Devant -February 2008 (published New Internationalist, Worldpress.org)

http://www.newint.org/features/special/2008/02/18/timor-leste/

http://www.worldpress.org/Asia/3073.cfm

http://towardfreedom.com/home/content/view/1239/1/

Timor-Leste’s President Jose Ramos-Horta was shot on 11 February by rebel soldiers in front of his idyllic home in the outskirts of Dili. It appears that he was attacked by a group of renegade soldiers. The President is in a ‘critical but stable’ condition, and he has been airlifted to Australia for further treatment. This incident is shocking, but shows how unstable the situation in Timor Leste still is. The ‘crisis’ that started in 2006 is far from over, and Timor Leste’s security forces are unable to provide security – even to the President himself. Once again, foreign troops and resources have been pledged to restore stability and development in East Timor.

The turmoil that has afflicted the country is a result of a complex political reality, and a society fractioned and weary after achieving the goal of independence. The attempted assassination of President and Prime Minister earlier this week must therefore be put into context.

No present without a past

In May 2005, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, in a speech marking the end of the UN peace-keeping operation in Timor-Leste, declared that the peacekeepers’ departure showed the world’s recognition of Timor as a safe and peaceful country, whose security agencies were able to take responsibility for its internal and external security. The outbreak of violence that started a year later sharply illustrates that this assessment was decidedly over-optimistic. In April 2006, the capital, Dili, went up in flames after the dismissal of 600 soldiers – nearly one third of the military – who protested against discrimination within the ranks of the newly formed Timorese army. The initially peaceful protest culminated in the death of at least 37 people and the displacement of two thirds of the capital’s residents. General frustration with the government’s failure to alleviate high unemployment and corruption, combined with objections to their response to turmoil in the defense force, encouraged numerous East Timorese to take up arms and join armed groups. Violent gangs of mostly unemployed youths joined the disaffected soldiers, roaming the streets of Dili, burning down houses and torching cars. Some members of the police force defected to join the dismissed soldiers, known as ‘the petitioners’, and openly confronted the military. Lethal clashes between elements of the national police force (PNTL) and the military (F-FDTL) were followed by widespread rioting and looting in the capital. Law and order broke down and within days the leadership of PNTL disintegrated.

Both the PNTL and the F-FDTL are not perceived to have the trust of the population or the capacity to provide adequate security and order. Past behaviour of some PNTL members while on duty reduced public confidence in the institution: some police members have been involved in sexual harassment, human rights violations, illegal weapons distribution and black market activities. The PNTL has been accused by a Human Rights Watch report of gross human rights violations and ‘police abuse has become one of East Timor’s most worrying human rights problems.’ Moreover, neither organisation is regarded as politically neutral.
Until the election in the summer of 2007, the F-FDTL fell under the control of President Gusmão – a former guerilla leader – while the PNTL reported to Rogerio Lobato who was a staunch Fretilin man – a long term rival of Gusmão, and also regarded as a liability by many within the party. The internal divisions within the leadership date back to the civil war and the Indonesian occupation.

Both institutions became internally fragmented due to their mixture of members from different regions and political backgrounds. Though ethnic and regional divisions had not previously been prominent in Timor-Leste, the April 2006 dispute had a significant regional component, and such affiliations quickly gained currency. Most of ‘the petitioners’ came from the West of the country and complained that they suffered discrimination in a force dominated by officers from the East (reflecting the force’s origins in the eastern-based, pre-independence, anti-Indonesian, armed resistance movement). A similar scenario could be observed in the police force, where some members served under the former Indonesian police – mainly from the West – while others were former members of the armed resistance – mainly from the East.

Almost 70% of disciplinary cases within the military resulted from confrontations with police personnel, many of whom were recruits from the former local Indonesian police force.[1] The problem culminated in a massacre in late May 2006, when F-FDTL soldiers killed 10 unarmed police officers under UN protection. Regional tensions affected not only the security forces, but increasingly Timorese civilians who identified themselves with either the East or West. Violent groups of youths from different parts of the country took advantage of the situation and made street-fighting a regular occurrence in Dili. A catholic priest described the situation as ‘East against West, soldiers against soldiers, police against soldiers, everyone against everyone … It’s total madness.’[2]

In the midst of the chaos, after a request from the Timorese government, Australia formed a multinational peace-keeping force to restore order in late May 2006. The removal of the Fretilin-led government and the subsequent electoral victory of the new government led by Xanana Gusmao took place under the guardianship of a United Nations-authorised Australian and New Zealand International Stabilisation Force (ISF). Up until the attempted coup, there were approximately a thousand international military personnel and 1,500 members of the United Nations police in Timor-Leste. Fresh troops from Australia have arrived in Dili.

Major Alfredo, the romantic?

Amidst the generalised mistrust of institutions that were meant to provide security and a leadership that was meant to honour the constitution, certain individuals became popular symbols among the population. Major Alfredo Reinaldo became a crucial figure at the time of the crisis. He led a group of military personnel and members of other security forces out of Dili. There, the Major and his men pledged allegiance to Xanana and Major Alfredo’s role in the crisis became both ambiguous and iconic over time. The Major became a symbol of the disenfranchised – youths, the poor, veterans –and he became key to balancing peace in East Timor. The Major was arrested in 2006, but escaped from Becora prison, downtown Dili, together with 56 other inmates, and later boasted in an interview that he waved at New Zealand soldiers as he left. The Major stayed in hiding, and calls for him to submit himself to justice failed. He remained defiant and after his men raided weapons from a police post in March 2007, President Xanana Gusmao sanctioned an Australian operation to capture him. The operation in Same resulted in several deaths, but Reinaldo eluded the Australian operation and his popularity grew among Dili youths. Reinado was able to accept the projected hopes of many of those for whom independence brought more disappointment and poverty. The youth in particular has become increasingly frustrated by the lack of government response. Combined with boredom, lack of opportunities for constructive activity and extensive alcohol abuse, Dili’s unemployment rate of a staggering 70% contributes to the volatile situation.

Major Reinaldo was a liability, but he was also bold and charismatic. His defiant messages to the authorities and vanishing acts made him a romantic figure that resonated with a generation that had lost its heroes. Max Stahl has likened him to East Timor’s ‘Che Guevara’: ‘A poster figure on laptops, and graffiti sketches around Dili’ and ‘Like a poster character, the meaning of his protest shifted its ground.’

While most media reports have been quick to qualify the assassination attempt as a coup, other are more cautious. James Dunne, for example, ‘Clearly, there is more to this than meets the eye and we need to know a lot more about it’ and said further that ‘As a coup, it was a very unlikely coup, totally botched and certainly one not in keeping with somebody who served as a major’. Stahl suggests that one possibility is that the assassination attempt was a desperate measure after 77 of the petitioners were reinstated in the army last week. Perhaps he feared losing his position of being a key figure in the balance of maintaining peace in Timor-Leste.

At this point, it is too early to tell. However, a final reflection on the role of Major Alfredo in Timorese society and the political scene as it is perceived by the population, may perhaps be provided by the rumours that have circulated in Dili in the hours after the attack. Rumour is often cited by observers to play a conspicuous role in crises, particularly in East Timor. Although it is impossible to compile rumours at any given time, at the early stages of an emergency there is little reliable information circulating, and rumours become the common ‘knowledge currency’. One blogger writes ‘Usually, the unconfirmed stories are about 90% correct but that 10% error can affect conclusions by 100%. Some local media were reporting that the President had died which everyone seems to agree is not the case. It is rarely straightforward here.’[3] These forms of misinformation may say more about the situation than is commonly assumed.

Some bloggers may provide the key to understanding the situation in East Timor better than media reports that are more readily available. A blogger on http://xananarepublic.blogspot.com cites Radio Timor-Leste reporting that Major Alfredo was in fact staying as a guest in the President’s home. Ramos-Horta is known in Dili to house guests on a regular basis. This, if true, would prove not only ironic but incongruous with most portrayals of the ‘renegade major’. If proved untrue, it still shows that the Major was perceived, not as a man on the margins of the Timorese political scene but as an essential part of it. This is a perception that does not always transpire in the international media.

In fact, Timorese authorities had been negotiating with a sometimes cooperative Alfredo, from the beginning of the 2006 crisis. Although he had become increasingly defiant and uncooperative, the authorities had decided that it was best to engage him in dialogue. On Tuesday the Australian Foreign Minister acknowledged that the President and Prime Minister of East Timor had requested that the International Stabilisation Forces halt the hunt for Alfredo nine months ago, and that the best way forward had been deemed to engage Major Alfredo in Dialogue.[4]

In a country with many heroes, and one great enemy (the Indonesian occupier and its stooges), it is difficult for outside observers to let go of eternal heroes, and to submit to the confusing reality of the Timorese political scene today. The events of February 11 have been shocking and tragic for, above all, the Timorese people themselves. Observers must portray the situation in its full complexity.

The problems Timor-Leste faces are numerous and multidimensional. The final report of the Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste warned that ‘the deep divisions in our society from 25 years of conflict, and the violence which entered East Timorese political life in 1975, remain a potential stumbling block to the development of a sustainable culture of democracy and peace in Timor-Leste.’[5] These factors, combined with very high unemployment, widespread poverty, and pervasive trauma provided a fertile ground that allowed what could have been a manageable protest to explode into protracted violence. The turmoil that has afflicted the country in recent years has put additional layers of complexity in the Timorese reality.

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[1] International Institute for Strategic Studies (The), 2006, Turmoil in Timor-Leste: Nation-building unravels.

[2] Barker, Anne, 2006, ‘Total madness’ as gangs fight in Dili, ABC Australia news Saturday, May 27, 2006

[3] http://wombathole.com/dili-gence/

[4] http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/02/12/2160982.htm

[5] Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation Timor-Leste (CAVR), 2005, Chega! The Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation Timor-Leste.

Wachsende Instabilität

Carole Reckinger - February 2007 (published WOXX Nr. 941)

Am vergangenen Montag wurde der Präsident von Osttimor, Jose Ramos- Horta, von rebellierenden Soldaten angegriffen und durch Schüsse verletzt. Der Vorfall ereignete sich in seinem Wohnhaus einige Meilen außerhalb der Hauptstadt Dili. Er befindet sich in einem „kritischen, aber stabilen“ Zustand und wurde für die weitere Behandlung per Hubschrauber
nach Australien transportiert. Der Vorfall zeigt, wie unsicher die Situation in Osttimor noch immer ist. Die „Krise“, die im Jahre 2006 begann, ist noch lange nicht vorbei und Osttimors Sicherheitskräfte sind unfähig, für die nötige Sicherheit zu sorgen. Nicht einmal für die des amtierenden Präsidenten.

Anhaltende Krise

Im Mai 2005 hatte der Sonderbeauftragte des UN-Generalsekretärs in einer Rede zum Ende des UN-Einsatzes zur Friedenssicherung in Osttimor erklärt, der Abzug der Friedenstruppen zeuge von der weltweiten Anerkennung Osttimors als eines sicheren und friedlichen Landes, dessen Sicherheitsbehörden fähig seien, die Verantwortung für die interne und die externe Sicherheit zu übernehmen. Der Ausbruch der Gewalt im darauffolgenden Jahr zeigte deutlich, dass
diese Bewertung der Situation viel zu optimistisch war. Im April 2006 kam es in der Hauptstadt Dili zu Aufständen, nachdem 600 Soldaten - fast ein Drittel der Armee - entlassen wurden, weil sie gegen die Diskriminierung in den Reihen der neu gegründeten timoresischen Armee protestiert hatten.

Die anfänglich friedliche Protestaktion endete mit dem Tod von mindestens 37 Menschen und der Vertreibung von zwei Dritteln der Bewohner der Hauptstadt. Die allgemeine Unzufriedenheit angesichts der Unfähigkeit der Regierung, die hohe Arbeitslosigkeit und Korruption zu bekämpfen, kombiniert mit Vorwürfen bezüglich der Handhabung des innermilitärischen Konfliktes, ermutigte viele Osttimoresen, zu den Waffen zu greifen und bewaffneten Gruppen beizutreten. Gewalttätige
Banden, größtenteils bestehend aus arbeitslosen Jugendlichen, haben sich den aufständischen Soldaten angeschlossen
und streifen nun durch die Straßen Dilis, brennen Häuser nieder und setzen Autos in Brand. Einige
Polizisten wechselten die Seite, taten sich mit den entlassenen Soldaten - den so genannten „petitioners“ - zusammen und gingen offen gegen die Armee vor. Auf tödliche Auseinandersetzungen zwischen der nationalen Polizei (PNTL) und der Armee (FFDTL) folgte ein großer Aufruhr in der Hauptstadt, gekoppelt mit zahlreichen Plünderungen. Die öffentliche Ordnung brach zusammen und innerhalb weniger Tage zerfiel auch die Führung der PNTL.

Mangel an Vertrauen

Weder der PNTL noch der F-FDLT wird zugetraut, dass sie das Vertrauen der Bevölkerung genießen oder die Fähigkeit besitzen, für Sicherheit und Ordnung zu sorgen. Das frühere Verhalten einiger PNTL-Mitglieder während ihrer Amtszeit hat das Vertrauen der Öffentlichkeit in diese Institution zerstört: Einige Polizisten waren an sexueller Belästigung, der Verletzung von Menschenrechten, der Verteilung illegaler Waffen und am Handel auf dem Schwarzmarkt beteiligt. Die PNTL wurde in einem Bericht von „Human Rights Watch“ der groben Verletzung von Menschenrechten bezichtigt. Der Bericht stellt fest, dass „polizeiliche Übergriffe zu einem von Osttimors beunruhigendsten Menschenrechtsproblemen
geworden sind“. Zudem wird keine der Organisationen als politisch neutral eingestuft. Bis zur Wahl im Sommer 2007 wurde die F-FDLT von Präsident Gusmão - einem früheren Guerilla-Führer - kontrolliert, während die PNTL mit Rogerio Lobato
in Verbindung gebracht wird, einem Anhänger der Fretilin und langjährigen Rivalen von Gusmão. Die Streitigkeiten
innerhalb der Führungselite in Osttimor datieren zurück auf den Bürgerkrieg und die langjährige Besetzung
durch Indonesien.

Beide Institutionen sind wegen der unterschiedlichen regionalen und politischen Herkunft der Mitglieder
intern zersplittert. Obwohl ethnische oder regionale Aufteilungen bis dahin keine Rolle in Osttimor spielten, hatte
der Konflikt vom April 2006 doch eine wichtige regionale Komponente. Die meisten der „petitioners“ kamen
aus dem Westen des Landes und beschwerten sich über die Diskriminierung innerhalb einer Armee, die
von aus dem Osten des Landes stammenden Offizieren dominiert wird (was auf den Ursprung der bewaffneten
antiindonesischen Widerstandsgruppen aus der Zeit vor der Unabhängigkeit
zurückzuführen ist).

Eine ähnliche Situation kann bei der Polizei beobachtet werden. Einige Mitglieder stammen aus der früheren indonesischen Polizei und kommen überwiegend aus dem Westen, während andere aus der bewaffneten Widerstandsbewegung kommen, vor allem aus dem Osten. Fast siebzig Prozent der armeeinternen Disziplinarverfahren sind auf Auseinandersetzungen mit Polizisten, von denen viele aus der früheren lokalen indonesischen Polizei stammen, zurückzuführen.
Ende Mai 2006 beispielsweise töteten Soldaten der F-FDTL zehn unter UN-Schutz stehende unbewaffnete Polizisten. Diese regionalen Spannungen haben nicht nur Konsequenzen für die Sicherheitskräfte, sondern auch für die timoresische
Bevölkerung. Diese identifiziert sich zunehmend entweder mit dem Osten oder dem Westen des Landes. Banden aus verschiedenen Teilen des Landes nutzen die Situation aus und liefern sich in den Straßen von Dili Kämpfe. Ein katholischer Priester beschreibt die Situation als „Osten gegen Westen, Soldaten gegen Soldaten, Polizei
gegen Soldaten, Jeder gegen Jeden… der totale Wahnsinn“.

Fehler beim Aufbau Der Zusammenbruch der öffentlichen Ordnung ist der Höhepunkt der vielen Probleme, die PNTL und
F-FDTL auf individueller, aber auch auf institutioneller Ebene haben. Die Krise vom April 2006 ist noch nicht
beendet, und das Land wird immer noch regelmäßig durch Kämpfe aufgerüttelt. Beispiele hierfür sind die Gewaltwelle, die es nach den Wahlen im Sommer 2007 gab, sowie das aktuelle Attentat auf Präsident Ramos-Horta. Die Bildung und die Entwicklung der Sicherheitskräfte hat auch zu diesen Problemen beigetragen. Beide wurden unter der „United Nations Transitional Administration“ (UNTAET), als Teil der Vorbereitungen zur Selbstregierung Osttimors, gegründet. Trotz jahrelanger UN-Regierung und der Milliarden, die für den Wiederaufbau Osttimors investiert wurden, mehren sich die
Anzeichen für einen Staatszerfall.

Eine unzureichende Planung des Aufbaus der Sicherheitskräfte sowie eine zu geringfügige Beteiligung der lokalen Bevölkerung, haben zu der aktuellen spannungsgeladenen Situation geführt. Die Geschichte der Entwicklung des Polizeidienstes und der Verteidigung in Osttimor unter den Vereinigten Nationen ist größtenteils geprägt von unorganisierter Planung und einfallsloser Führung. Den Sicherheitskräften fehlt das Vertrauen
der Bevölkerung und sie sind nicht fähig, gegen die Unruhen und Wellen der Gewalt vorzugehen. Die Probleme,
denen sich Osttimor stellen muss, sind dennoch zahlreich und mehrdimensional. Der Abschlussbericht
der „Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste“ warnt, „die tiefen Spaltungen, die in
unserer Gesellschaft durch 25 Jahre an Konflikten entstanden sind, und die Gewalt, die ab 1975 das politische Leben Osttimors bestimmte, stellen immer noch einen potenziellen Stolperstein für die Entwicklung einer nachhaltigen Kultur von Demokratie und Frieden in Osttimor dar“. Diese Faktoren, zusammen mit einer sehr hohen Arbeitslosigkeit, großer Armut
und einem allgemein präsenten Trauma trugen dazu bei, dass ein an sich kontrollierbarer Protest zu einer lang anhaltenden Gewaltorgie werden konnte.